

**Terrorism as a means of politics of "new public diplomacy"
(Comparisons the analysis of strategy of terrorism and antiterrorism of
movements).**

Khikmatov F.Kh.

International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan

Tashkent State Technical University

Abstract

In clause the problem the international terrorism antiterrorist activity of his(its) development is considered.

keywords: politics, new public diplomacy, strategy, antiterrorism

Introduction Working with the future has both theoretical and practical aspects. Theoretical aspects, as a rule, always refer to the field of philosophy, while practical aspects exist in those areas that are supported by intellectual and financial side. One of these areas is the military sphere. Today, the costs to the military sphere are constantly increasing, and the goal is to develop through them a new method and methodology of fighting the enemy. The creation of such methods represents an endless process. Terrorism is an adversary's weapon as a new and modern method that has prompted many countries to revise and defend many of their defensive strategies for effective fighting.

The fact that terrorism is becoming an extremely dangerous political phenomenon today, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the outbreak of its rotting process with religious extremism, prohibits the formation of a single, new system of struggle against it.

Therefore, this article focuses on the objectives and methods of action of terrorists, forms of manifestation of international terrorism, directions of action and processes of religious extremism.

In his concept of extremism and terrorism, the author, based on personal analysis and experience, is convinced that any significant phenomena in the field of organized extremism and terrorism are:

- a consequence of the work of special services of large states, the activities of which are ensured by an appropriate political decision and fit into the political strategy of a particular state;
- are closely related to the political strategy of a state as a set of tools, as a rule, additional, aimed at private (specific) political tasks;
- are a continuation of the logic of using certain means of public diplomacy (diplomatic, ideological, media, etc.);
- a continuation of one or another ideological doctrine that can mobilize significant forces from many countries. So, in 2012-2016, more than 30 thousand foreign citizens from more than 100 countries of the world participated in Syria.

For example, what is the size of the ISIS, the Taliban movement and the Al-Qaeda, specifically against Russia, the US Army, the state or organization that is fighting terrorism? Bruce Hoffman, a well-known expert on antiterrorist activity, at the same time the director of the RAND's Department in Washington, gives the following opinion, taken from a variety of information: 70 thousand members of the Al-Qaeda were arrested, of which 130 million were arrested around the world. US dollars equivalent funds have been frozen from transaction. Admittedly, this is a small number and the amount. However, against them it is worth spending billions of US dollars.¹

The strong side of Ben Laden was that he was able to present this strike as a clash of civilizations, while the US is trying to deny it with difficulty. In the 90's of the XX century it was transferred to the forms of a sectoral organization. He sets out his goals as president of a large corporation and issues orders, effectively utilizing communications from top to bottom, from bottom to top. He was able to occupy both the virtual and the information space of his audience.

¹ Hoffman B. The leadership secrets of Osama bin Laden // Atlantic. - 2003. - April

B.Hoffman divides 4 types associated with Al-Qaeda. They are different in terms of behavior, because in Al-Qaeda everything is not a moving model on a move. They are as follows:

- **qualified personnel:** these are personnel who are qualified, trained, funded on the basis of strict requirements;
- **trained amateurs:** these are individuals who receive simple guidelines and seek to move independently, at the same time they are engaged in the work of attracting new members;
- **local groups:** these are Islamic radical groups that come up with their own terrorist ideas and want to get financial support from the Al-Qaeda;
- **partisans and terrorists who are morally close to each other.** These are the partisans and terrorist groups in existence who, in their time, received help from Al-Qaeda to support the Universal jihad.²

The same options itself demonstrate that Al Qaeda has the ability to adapt. Due to the fact that its structures are able to move independently, it has the authority to study the conditions without waiting for the command from the top and to look for its own ways of influencing it. Ben Laden himself draws attention to the way in which he brings great sacrifices and intimidates social thought through it. If we use these thoughts of a specialist in relation to ISIS and Taliban, we will not have an exaggeration.

Now let's analyze who and why they are fighting in the Great War in the Middle East, which is now shaking the world. What is happening in the region can be compared to the war that lasted 17 years in 30 century Europe. At that time, there was also a mixed-construction of religious differences, political - economic (geopolitical - geo-economic) interests.

There is a war in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Yemen. In fact, there is a war in the Middle East between Shiites and Sunnis, which are considered the two largest factions of Islam. However, the target from the wars is not only these. There are

² Hoffman B. What can we learn from the terrorists? // www.rand.org

also political (geopolitical), national and economic (geo-economic) reasons for the war.

Professor **Richard H. Schultz**, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at the request of the Pentagon, analyzed strategy during the Clinton era. This summary document was kept secret at the beginning, according to which during the B.Clinton era, the Prevention of terrorist attacks was not a priority. In January 2004, this document was presented to the public. R.Schultz interviewed many people who participated in the decision-making process on this problem and showed nine reasons for the correct reaction to terrorism in the Clinton era:

1. **Terrorism as a criminal offense:** the standard of such an image of terrorism was the reason for the non-recognition of the standard of its assessment as war;
2. **Real danger or war:** presenting terrorism as war would face obstacles;
3. **Somali syndrome:** Clinton was under the influence of a popular argument that foreign policy was declared by the CNN during her first presidential year: that is, Somali soldiers were entertained over the body of American soldiers and this sheet was presented to the general public by the CNN;
4. **Lack of legal grounds:** the Ministry of defense could not carry out secret operations;
5. **Risk-related antipathy:** military attempts to link the use of special units with risk and substantiate the need for their non-use;
6. **Unrecognized Cowboys:** the proposal to enter the war in the Clinton administration came from individuals with the status of a citizen in the National Security Council (that is, not from the military), naturally, the military States did not recognize them;
7. **Intimidation of citizens:** the military has denied the proposal of the civil status quo;
8. **Multiple tracks:** special operations should not leave traces, but these operations were intended to attract a large number of techniques and people;

9. **Lack of action-oriented intelligence work.** Intelligence data is so broad that it did not specify the exact point. For example, the number of places where Ben Laden could hide in them was all lowered ³.

All these factors have caused terrorism not to be recognized as a war. An anonymous version of the report is presented as an appendix to the book of R. Scarborough, "The Battle of Rumsfeld". It features the 4th Generation War:

- military actions will be non-modular, non-standard and demarcated;
- asymmetric operations are used against strong military structures;
- The 4th Generation War uses the techniques of directing the enemy to a false path and other intelligence;
- terrorist organizations use information technologies of the century, which provide global access to the enemy system;
- the difference between the citizens and the military is lost, there will be no fronts;
- terrorists do not have restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction;
- The 4 generation military will consist of merciless soldiers, whose operations are characterized on the basis of unrestrained violence .⁴

D. Tucker expressed his opinion on the concept of a new era of terrorism, emphasizing the foundation of which today are the amateurs. It has flexible and light flexibility within networking organizations and also has initiative. The modern information revolution undermined and cheapened the opportunities for sorting out resources. Modern terrorists try to take control of communication, because through communication it is easy to identify them, so they are interested in controlling it.⁵

³ Shultz R.H., Jr. Showstoppers. Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11 In Weekly Standard. - 2004. - January 24

⁴ Scarborough R. Rumsfeld's war. The untold story of America's anti-terrorist niinlander. - Washington, 2004

⁵ Tucker D. What's new about the new terrorism and Iliiw dangerous is it? // Terrorism and Political Violence. - 2016. - Vol. 13. -Autumn

Amateurs can accumulate for a short period of time and spread after the formation of a horoscope. It is difficult to identify them, it is also difficult to put pressure on them, because they do not have a permanent organization and infrastructure. That is, they are not an understandable goal.

In principle, another form of thinking is also an important factor, at a new stage, not the high technology of the army, the “savage wars” became a great danger, such a stroke is not limited to anything and is not regulated.

Band War today is defined as a military action, in the framework of which the enemy band uses the form of organization and the doctrines and strategies that are close to it. These organizations consist of a small division, individuals, moving independently. With him, the old-fashioned way can not be fought.

Those who plan to develop the future development of their armies need certain criteria. Two methodology in this direction looks interesting:

- **counter-threat opportunities:** planning will be aimed at creating the most powerful military forces, at this time, military intelligence will take into account the broad perspectives of the foreign military, economic, political, cultural factors, from which they will receive information on new manifestations of the types of danger.

- prophecy: planners need help, advice in expressing an opinion on what conditions the army will act in the future.

Analysts should clearly distinguish the following from the “textbook” of the CIA:

- factors that affect the change of development option payout. For example, what result does an alternative action bring? What can come up with the opposite result?

- phase indicators: what can show that the event is not going as we expected?
- events that seriously twist the lines. What events bring about unexpected development?

R.Kugler defends the term persuasion instead of the term insecurity. If persuasion is aimed at stimulating action, then distrust is an incentive to inaction. The author believes that if **anti-terrorist actions** take an effective advantage of distrust, their strategic effectiveness will be significantly increased. This approach changes the structure of the military forces. This approach aims to distribute the land forces instead of the aviation and naval forces around the world. An individual approach is applied to each region, since it must adapt to geopolitical changes.⁶

The development of this new concept is influenced by the following factors:

- introduction to information civilization;
- expanding of chaotic systems;
- chaotic systems - the shift of the "Cold War" concept to a new friend/enemy concept, an increase in the uncertainty of roles

Insecurity is interpreted as geopolitical instruments, he or she is carried out either by military intimidation, or by light diplomatic pressure.

G.Treventon's conception is also similar. He protects the strategy of coercion. It is said in it: "it is light to get a bolt on their minds, but in itself it is not an easy task. Instead of their bunkers, there will be an opportunity to kick in the head of the leaders."⁷ All this indicates that the "rules of the game" have changed in principle. The introduction of changes on the one hand requires the modification of the rules of the game on the other.

Coercion should be described as a campaign. But it is also necessary to prepare the answer to the following questions: What should be done when the risk does not work?

The concept of victory is also constantly confused, because the tasks are constantly changing. G.Trivington recommends the following steps regarding the change in the essence of victory:

⁶ Kugler R.L. Dissuasion as a strategic mincept // Strategic forum. - December 2012. - N 196

⁷ Treverton G.F. Framing impellent strategies. - Santa Monica, 2000 / RAND

- as soon as you win, announce that you have already won, because then you will have to conquer new challenges, tasks, finish;
- away from the lie of victory;
- set goals for both the general public and the campaign organizers.⁸

The war in Syria has shown how wrong and ambiguous the concepts of goal and victory are:

In order to protect US interests in China and Taiwan relations, the following instrument is proposed:

- Particular attention should be paid to who and what to persuade to return;
- Analysis of American politics as a system;
- Who and with what instrumental is distrusted?

B.Jenkins interprets terrorism as a provocation of political war. "Today, the enemy is represented by ideology, thought systems and organizational networks that complement terrorist losses without political defeat. In essence, this is the war in the virtual space."⁹ He proposes to use the old holding system against the structures that support terrorism.

About the modeling of events can also be expressed as a way of organizing the future. D.Leyn and R.Maxfield offers 2 theories of motion, combining effort and uncertainty. First, conditionally named the theory of actions "Prussian military", according to which the essence of subordination to various orders coming from the top lies in the theory. Its drawback is that the lower ones always do not know in what conditions and situations the lower ones will move. The second theory offers a set of options, taking as a basis the possible consequences from the action. Players' experience gives them the opportunity to predict the future. The authors themselves describe the actions as a state of being and being in time.¹⁰

The new space of security is characterized by principled changes, ignoring them, a number of problems arise in the development of post-Soviet countries.

⁸ Treverton G.F. Framing impellent strategies. - Santa Monica, 2000 / RAND

⁹ Jenkins B.M. Countering al Qaeda. - Santa Monica, 2002 / RAND. - P. 24

¹⁰ Lane D.A., Maxfield R.R. Ontological uncertainty and innovation II www.santafe.edu

Analyzing military conflicts in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan, American analysts point to the following development paths as to what consequences the changes in the security space can bring:

Migration of conflict to the Asian region. In principle, this should change the model of war. During the Cold War, the war was directed at the European Center (large military bases, etc.);

The beginning of the established military coalitions. If during the Cold War the US was oriented towards official organizations (for example, NATO), then in the future, attention will be paid to temporary unions;

Changes in contributions from partners on coalitions. The expansion of military capabilities will leave the allies, but the importance of intelligence and special units will be retained;

Increased regional access issues. To carry out suppression operations, you need a political permit as well as a physical opportunity to use alien territory, which is problematic.

Options to overcome the danger of the enemy side and use force. The enemy effectively takes advantage of the shortcomings that are being avoided by the anti-terrorist forces, seeks to weaken the possibilities of the coalition through international public pressure.

For example, the US took a big lesson during the war with Iraq. They felt that they were able to lead a war even without allies. In this matter, R.Perlu advocates the following idea: the United States always strives to act with its allies, but from these actions the level of its allies is lower than that of the United States, that is, their interests do not coincide with the interests of the United States. They do not transmit intelligence information about risk opportunities to their citizens like us every day. They are not victims of 11 September. All this can be justified on the basis of the trend "goodbye, ally".¹¹

¹¹ *Perle R*". How the United States can best deal with li imrism // www.aei.org

Each variant of terrorism has a cycle that gives its supporters the opportunity to expand, these supporters eventually become a real fighter. Such a description can also be given to hacker groups, they also have a level of danger. Such groups become completely dangerous in 2 year of their activity. Here it is possible to use the idea of time-critical-target. This concept applies to rocket launchers that can be detected in motion but cannot be detected in the background. The cycle of creating terrorists is also a time that gives them a conscious opportunity.

The globalisation process takes transnational risks to the first level. The basis for the occurrence of such risks is mainly poverty, which is not developed economically enough, terrorism is encouraged from them. Therefore, the Prevention of terrorism today requires work not only in the military sphere, but also in the economic and other spheres. Another common element of the recent era is the problem of international processes of decision - making in a collective way.

When the US started the war against Iraq, it avoided the collective decision-making process, which caused the discontent of many international subjects:

Decision-making at the internal political level is also a number of problems, because in it internal and external, military priorities collide. For example, on the example of Iraq, Vietnam and the Middle East, intelligence experts opposed the war. However, many experiments show that important decisions are made under conditions of political pressure and the opinion of specialists is not taken into account. For example, when American troops invaded Cuba, the population believed that Castro would not defend the regime, but they were mistaken.

The complexity of the decision-making process in the external and internal space is associated with the complexity of the analysis in the field of internal security. The commission investigating the events of 11 September comes to the conclusion that the Federal Aviation government had considered the danger of martyr-terrorists in 1998 year, but nevertheless those who are paying attention to the explosion devices. Once again, **the wrong choice of defense strategy can lead to a terrorist attack.**

Another aspect of the problem is the strategy of the Political Order (regime) of states and determines the form and essence of tactical decision-making. Russia's famous specialist in management in this regard G.B.Kochetkov points out the following: “the success of strategic thinking depends on how much “strategic thinking” the leaders of this organization are able to achieve at the level of solution, the direction they are directed to it, because qualified planners only ensure the passage of the planned process and its effectiveness, but they themselves can not implement strategic planning in the organization.”

The classification of errors can be determined both by the decision that can be made in the future, and by the type of decision.

Error decision making involves the following:

- priorities are chosen incorrectly;
- performers are incorrectly identified;
- alternative options arise incorrectly;
- the list of risks is wrong, the weak points are marked by an error, etc.

Because here the list of risks is drawn up quite broadly.

Over time, the Bush administration (Jr.) will also consider the problems it faces:

- the policy must be presented to the internal and external audience, often the problem of its proper presentation arises, since 2 must also please the audience;
- there is a difference between theory and practice in the implementation of domestic and foreign policy;
- there is a difference between the ends and means of domestic and foreign policy.

The emergence of a new type of enemy on a non-standard level dictates the development of a new strategy of fighting with them. The old types of strategies showed their inefficiency, so the demand for the actions of the new antiterrorism increased. US Defense Deputy Minister Paul Wolfowitz went out to the graduates of the military and Navy College and said: “Our goal is not just to “manage”

terrorism or simply arrest them after the terrorist attacks, but to sue them. Our goal is to destroy the confidence in terrorism as slavery and piracy lost their trust in the 19th century."¹²

Many long-term strategies will be able to pass exactly into the virtual space, having dominated the ideology in this space, it will be predetermined who is right, who is wrong. By changing this system, you can change the nature of terrorism.

The Real space is represented by an information space, while the information space transmits the event to a virtual space. Our world map will be dressing only when 3 space is combined: virtual, information and real space.

Brian Jenkins, whom we noted above, shows the position of the virtual methodology, the scope of the impact. The victory of the terrorists is a solution in favor of Osama bin Laden, that is, they help to attract members. Because this victory characterizes the victory of Islam in the interpretation of Al-Qaeda.¹³

The influence of the US on the Arab countries came out of their own problems. But the Arab world is using the coming information efficiently. The information objectives do not yield their effect.

R.Zaharna also shows a number of new inconsistencies. The US looks at mas-media as the most reassuring medium, while Arab countries do not trust the media at all. The US tries to believe with proof, with proof, but metaphor and comparison in Arab countries occupy an important place.

In front of us, two incompatible virtual cultures are ravaged, their information-level priorities are different. G.Bush's direct contact with the audience is supported by the Americans, but is perceived by the Arab audience as a confrontation. American and Arab audiences have different persuasion technologies. The incompatibility of Virtual methodologies is reflected in information methodologies. As a result, the goal does not come true.¹⁴

¹²Wolfowitz P. The greatest deed are yet to be done // Naval War College View. - It's 2004. - Winter

¹³Jenkins B.M. Counting al Qaeda. An appreciation of the situation and suggestions for strategy. - Santa Monica, 12/RAND. -P. 5-6

¹⁴Zaharna R.S. American public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds //www.fpif.org

It is impossible to ignore the presence of elements of uncertainty even in the issues of anti-terrorist struggle strategy. Analysts say that strategic warfare can be unstable due to shifting priorities in instrumentation, while volume, scale, intensity and duration are some of the main uncertainties.

- Uncertainty is maintained as the main characteristic of planning;
- the war is non-destructive and will remain in a state of change;
- volume, scale, intensity and duration remain unknown;
- great potential of enemies and risks;
- The type and countries of American military mobilization is not clear;
- Ability to use military, national and international instruments;
- Coalition support level is uncertain;
- Disruptions in the campaign will bring out new changeable students;
- Time does not specify the criteria for military actions.

Many criteria in a war cause a change in priorities, which leads to a change in the type of hostilities and an increase in the degree of uncertainty in warfare.

In order to overcome uncertainty, organizational structures change, both military units and the rules of functioning change. Therefore, at such times, the importance of partisan wars increases. Because in it there will be another type of mobility and options for adopting the law.

J. Arkville and D. Ronfield defends a new kind of military junkies, he received the name "Swarming". This is developing in both defense and attack areas. Earlier, they introduced into scientific circulation the concept of a sectoral war. The New-looking movement is a continuation of this band War. Historically, they define four paradigms of hostilities.

- battle (fight)
- to attract to the center
- manoeuvre

- swarming bees (like flying) (or swarm bees)¹⁵

Each type of Paradigm assimilates its previously used achievements. In the last military action (swarming), the information revolution is widely used. In the beginning, a chaotic shooting occurred, everyone was fighting for himself. Then they attracted the military to one point, then came the period of maneuvers. Swarming has emerged as a new doctrine in recent years. They interpret Swarming as an action that allows them to suddenly attack the enemy from all sides connected with each other.

Characteristics of the action of reciprocity:

Main characteristics

- face-to-face, light spreading units
- almost impossible to manage and control in times of struggle

Historical examples

- on Earth: ancient Persian state, Asian armies, feudal wars
- in the sea: sea Wars to Drain (16 century)
- In the air: World War I, Air wars
- in society: tribal strife, the city of Paris during the French Revolution.

Centralization brings out new types of weapons. Its features:

The main characteristic

- front, geometrical education with "wave"
- hierarchy, form and doctrines that accept the attack
- adoption of technology: writing, letter, alarm systems, preparation in series

Historical examples

- on Earth: Alexander phalanges against the Persian troops
- on the sea: the Battle of the British, the hard border lines of the Dutch (XVII century)
- in the air: World War II and air strikes in Vietnam

¹⁵ Arquilla C., Ronfield D. Swarming and the future of conflict. - Santa Monica, / RAND

- in society: 1948 year riots in European cities

New written commands that appear in relation to previous verbal commands bring new possibilities for management. They were used as long-term guidelines, while alarm systems were used for dynamic messaging. The phalanges of Alexander the Great proved that small forces can overcome adults.

The maneuver war became a new strategic discovery of mankind:

Main characteristics

- complex, synchronous, fast, versatile operations that amaze the enemy, give the opportunity to get into it
- the use of a moving public at a decisive moment
- adopted technology: electronic communications (radio)

Historical example

- on land: Roman manipulations, German tank troops
- at the sea: Nelson in Trafalgar, Togo in Tsushima
- in the air: acceptance of blitzkrieg operation
- in society: the Mexican Revolution, the Russian Revolution

In the maneuver, all forces simultaneous movement is considered prime. Revolutions leaned on strong mass movements, but they were not always bloody. In India, for example, a peaceful company of Gandhi against the British Empire.

The Bee Galaxy requires organizational innovation and needs the best strategies for information gathering and sorting. As an example, it is possible to bring a hit in Vietnam or Afghanistan. In these wars, guerrilla detachments had the opportunity to move freely.

Main characteristics

- autonomous units attacking a common goal
- attack from all sides in the specified way
- many maneuver units that are associated with a small one
- command-giving feature for tracking, intelligence, top echelon
- attacks are aimed at violating the integrity of the enemy

Since the attacks are carried out from many sides, it is necessary to conduct intelligence work on the situation of many parties. In essence, the 4 stage War is similar to the 1 Stage war, at that time, methods of chaotic interaction with the enemy were also used. But with the new communication tools, these impacts will have better management and plan. The difference from the previous stage is that they are carefully planned in advance. Battle options should be incomprehensible to ordinary people, the enemy. Henson reported that he met with military leaders who were stupid. Their thinking, understanding of the options of action they were creating, was difficult or completely impossible for others. It is difficult to strike at such moving associations, therefore, pay attention to their structures. After all, the Americans did not speak in vain about the need to fight with the roots of terrorism. Vice President O.Cheney "... the essence of our strategy is that the relations between terrorist organizations and the sponsor countries financing terrorist organizations are a war," he said. Terrorists who are strong in one position will be weak in another. O. Cheney argues that it is necessary to deal not only with defense, but also with the attack. The risks of a new look require a new logic-based operation.

From the foregoing, the following conclusions follow:

1. Opposition to the ideology of terrorism and extremism implies, first of all, political and ideological opposition, at least, the presence of another active political ideology, which will be even more attractive and effective than the ideology of terrorism and extremism. Accordingly, if you do not have such an ideology, then you do not have such an instrument of counteraction.

Unfortunately, it should be recognized that this was somewhat late: the ban on state ideology that exists in the Constitution of the Russian Federation is often seen as a rejection of ideology altogether. This interpretation is actively supported by liberal circles, which retained their influence in power.

2. In this regard, it is necessary to return to what we call and what we mean by the term "ideology". Ideology is a system of views, a way of conceptual

thinking, when a particular phenomenon is considered in its essence, its relationship with others, is predicted and evaluated in its consequences. Ideology is also the most effective control system, including one that can counteract the enemy.

3. The ideology of extremism and terrorism is their essence, the basis, without which these phenomena cannot have a full-fledged and massive political, and therefore dangerous, nature. Accordingly, it is necessary to fight, first of all, with the ideology of extremism and terrorism with the help of another ideology. Moreover, the carriers of such an ideology, as a rule, are not only controlled by the relevant special services, but also created and supported by them (as it exists in Ukraine and Syria).

An analysis of the current international and military-political situation (IO and HPE) shows a close relationship between the methods of public diplomacy and extremism. Moreover, he emphasizes once again that the latter are part of the entire toolkit of the former. This analysis manifests itself in the following trends:

1. Changes in the balance of forces between local human civilizations (LCHC) and centers of power in the world, primarily between the Western LChC, Chinese, Russian and Indian.

2. The desire by force, including through military force, to maintain control over the financial, economic and military-political systems by the Western LCHC.

3. Military power - the West is again in demand, which means the return of military force to politics, including especially its special forms.

4. International legal and political institutions are rapidly giving way to military force under the pressure of deliberate Western policy, becoming obsolete, ineffective, and, therefore, requiring either liquidation or a deep reorganization, of course, in the interests of the West. This means that the entire system of international security left over from the 20th century is threatened, which is threatened by "modernization" and the transformation into an international legal system convenient for the West.

5. Strengthening the significance of non-military instruments of violence: distortion of objective realities, the creation of a new “virtual reality”, the use of media, network tools, as tools of force.

Authoritative experts acknowledge that in the United States, recruiting was done through social networks, especially at the very beginning. Potential recruits connected through social networks with ISIS sympathizers.

In place of the conclusion, it should be noted that today the process of globalisation brings transnational risks to the first level. The basis for the occurrence of such risks is mainly poverty, which is not developed economically enough, terrorism is encouraged from them. Therefore, the Prevention of terrorism today requires work not only in the military sphere, but also in the economic and other spheres. Another common element of the recent era is the problem of international processes of decision - making in a collective way.

A strong strategy is a strategy in which the enemy is not ready. The promotion of such a strategy will bring not great results.

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