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Abstract
The dynamics of center–state relations are central to the functioning of federal systems around the world. Federalism is premised on a constitutional division of power between national and subnational governments, but in practice the distribution and exercise of authority is shaped by history, political culture, economic pressures, and judicial interpretation. This paper critically examines the theoretical foundations of federalism and the institutional mechanisms through which central and constituent units interact. Drawing upon comparative examples, it explores models of asymmetric and symmetrical federal relations, fiscal federalism, and the role of conflict and cooperation in maintaining systemic equilibrium. The paper assesses how power is negotiated, contested, and transformed within federal frameworks, highlighting the importance of legal frameworks, political negotiation, and economic interdependence in shaping center–state dynamics. It concludes that effective federal governance depends not only on constitutional design but also on adaptive practices that respond to social change, economic imbalance, and political asymmetries. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for scholars and policymakers aiming to enhance democratic governance, regional equity, and national cohesion in federal states.